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Abstract—“Give us your fingerprint, your Iris print, your 
photograph. Trust us; we want to make your life easier!” This is 
the implicit message behind many corporations’ move towards 
avid collection and use of biometrics, and they expect us to accept 
their assurances at face value. Despite their attempts to sell this 
as a wholly philanthropic move, the reality is that it is often done 
primarily to ease their own processes or to increase profit. They 
offer no guarantees, allow no examination of their processes, and 
treat detractors with derision or sanction. The current biometric 
drive runs counter to emergent wisdom about the futility of a 
reductionist approach to humanity. Ameisen et al. (2007) point 
out that the field of integrative biology is moving towards a more 
holistic approach, while biometrics appear to be moving in the 
opposite direction, reducing humans to sets of data with 
cartographic locators: a naïve over-simplification of the 
uniqueness that characterizes humanity. They argue that 
biometrics treat the body as an object to be measured, but in fact 
the body is a subject, the instantiation of the individual’s self, 
subject to vulnerability and mortality. Treating it merely as a 
measured and recorded object denies the body’s essential right to 
dignity. Here we explore various concerning aspects of the global 
move towards widespread biometric use. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The ‘connective turn’ [22][23] has ushered in a living 
archive of networked consumers: a new mass public requiring 
regular and frequent access to machines, to services, and to 
others. This ‘turn’ is an emergent set of tensions and transitions 
from a ‘scarcity’ to a ‘post-scarcity’ culture ushered in by the 
abundance, pervasiveness and accessibility of communication 
networks, nodes, and digital media content.  
In this environment, the basics of personal identity, privacy 
and individual and social memory, become increasingly 
entangled with networked literacies:  our capacity to navigate, 
contribute, organize, order, classify, search, and retrieve digital 
content. These digital technologies and modes of 
communication have significantly infiltrated our personal and 
public selves and relationships, to an extent that our lives seem 
unthinkable without media. Mark Deuze, for instance proposes 
that media studies as a discipline ‘should take as its point of 
departure a view of life not lived with media, but in media’ 
([13]: 49ff).  
This ‘media life’ perspective manifests itself across a whole 
swathe of personal, social and cultural phenomena. It is 
particularly indicative of a period in which the biological, 
social and technological domains, which have historically often 
been seen and studied as quite separate fields, are being 
explored more dynamically, holistically and as part of the same 
‘ecology’. The growth of Science and Technology Studies 
(STS) and Human Computer Interaction (HCI) have 
contributed to this paradigm-shift.  
In this paper we explore the development of biometrics as a 
technological means successfully to identify and/or verify 
individuals. We explore some ethical aspects as prerequisites to 
guarantee widespread user acceptance thereof.  Biometrics are 
essentially technologies that measure and analyze 
characteristics of the human body to enable authentication of 
the user. As such, they are inextricably a security-of-the-self. 
These include: facial recognition, fingerprints, eye retinas and 
Irises, and voice patterns. Our concern here is how biometrics 
‘technologize’ a memory-of-the-self, and particularly through 
their convergence with the domain of corporate security.  
By the ‘technologization’ of memory, we build on 
emergent work in the field of Memory Studies which has 
begun to  grasp some of the dynamics of what might be called 
the ‘mediatization’ of memory and how the making of memory 
is increasingly embedded in and distributed through our 
‘sociotechnical practices’ [9][40][19]. Memory has long been 
characterized through the separation of or tension between the 
internal (mind and body) and the external (representations, 
media etc.) domains [14]. Yet biometrics undermine the very 
basis of this distinction through taking the relatively contained 
uniqueness of the self and distributing it through an 
unpredictable media ecology. In these circumstances, 
biological matter acquires a qualitatively different status; it 
becomes ‘informational’ ([8]: p.7). That is, it becomes subject 
to connectivity, to the logics and (in)securities of the network. 
Once biological matter and the formation and reformation of 
memory from this matter are made informational, then the 
function, ownership, uses and abuses of memory are more-or-
less lost to the self. Instead, it is the keepers of the network that 
determine how one’s past is stored and strewn across the new 
media ecology. 
Meanwhile, the technologization of security is tied to the 
inexorable rise of computing and networking. In the early days 
of computing, networks were relatively limited in their 
numbers of users, and the ancient and well-understood 
technique of the password served the security of these systems 
perfectly well. Today, the humble password is under severe 
strain, made fallible through its exponential use, both for users 
who have to devise passwords, and for systems that have to 
recognize each individual in the digital crowd with a 
978-1-4799-7755-0/15/$31.00 ©2015 IEEE
reasonable level of certainty that will stand up to legal scrutiny 
in some cases. 
  Requiring users periodically to change passwords, in 
an attempt to improve security, to contain the sharing and 
proliferating use of the same password across systems, is a 
flawed measure. The greater the frequency of the forced 
change, the less likely it is that it will be retained in human 
memory, and the greater the likelihood of it being written down 
to safeguard against loss. Moreover, the computer screen is 
both the most convenient and the most public repository for the 
password (written on a post-it note). 
  Passwords are fundamentally shareable, passed 
around, loaned out, lent to another when the authorized user is 
unavailable or wants to delegate [12]. In many ways then, 
authenticating based on what someone knows does not prove 
identity: it only confirms shared knowledge, knowledge that 
can easily be transferred to another, either deliberately or 
inadvertently. Whereas the password performed well when 
used by small populations of technical users, when it went 
global it became obvious that the mechanism did not scale 
satisfactorily. 
  To address the challenges of memorability and the 
insecurity of sharing, many service providers are turning to 
biometrics. What is not easily memorable needs to be 
externalized: and after the connective turn some argue that 
modern memory is less about remembering and more about 
knowing where to look. Biometrics returns memory to the self. 
They displace the vagaries and uncertainties of the external and 
the collective worlds. 
  This investment in the memory of the security of the 
self also requires a certain divesting of the self. The password 
shared, copied and lost is ultimately replaceable. However, 
biometrics work through the guarantor of relative uniqueness, a 
uniqueness that, once lost, is not retrievable. 
Biometrics are widely used by government agencies that 
have traditionally held a certain degree of public trust in their 
use of personal data, or at least in situations that did not include 
an element of choice. For instance, many countries capture 
biometrics before issuing passports: those who are 
uncomfortable with this are not accommodated; they simply 
cannot travel abroad unless they acquiesce. Unfortunately the 
competence of such agencies in recent years has been suspect 
[4]. A series of national scandals in the accumulation of 
database records, lost [11], hacked or misplaced, or 
‘accidentally’ made public, has dissipated public trust in those 
charged with the protection and preservation of our most 
personal data. 
  Corporate managers of private information have been 
shown to be more even more susceptible to such scandals [5]. 
Thus, the spread of the use of biometrics into this particularly 
shaky sphere of personal security, through the unevenness of 
its regulation and accountability, seems a risky move for the 
biometric giver, but with very little cost to the biometric 
recorder. As such, the power relationship is skewed in favor of 
the corporation, at the expense of the employee or customer. 
II. DEFINING BIOMETRICS 
Biometrics appear to address the memorability and sharing 
problems of passwords in one fell swoop. There are two 
distinct kinds of biometric: 
Physiological 
Often referred to as “what you are”. Examples are fingerprints, 
Iris scans and faces.   More esoteric biometrics include ear 
prints, gait analysis and even eyeball reflex patterns. Most 
biometrics require additional hardware to be able to “read” the 
biometric and to compare it to the previously recorded pattern. 
Behavioural 
Referred to as “what you do”. This kind of biometric collects 
information as you use a device, perhaps while you type or 
speak into the microphone. The biometric then stores a 
template that represents your common patterns. When you use 
the device again the biometric system compares your current 
usage with the master pattern and generates a percentage level 
that indicates the level of matching between the two. 
Passwords and PINs can implement a binary decision: the 
secrets either match or they don’t. If they do, the person gains 
access, otherwise access is denied. Authenticating with 
biometrics constitutes a less clear-cut process. Biometrics 
commonly deliver a confidence level, a percentage that 
indicates how well the newly collected and stored templates 
match. Many factors can interfere with this process: changes in 
the human due to injury or age, faults within the equipment or 
simply the result of a poor “reading”. The system bases its 
decision according to a risk threshold. For example, if the 
threshold is set to 90%, and the matching delivers a confidence 
of 89% the person will be rejected. Any confidence level above 
90% will result in the person being authenticated. Two types of 
errors result from the use of biometrics confidence levels: 
1. False Reject, when a genuine user is rejected; 
2. False Accept, when an imposter is erroneously 
authenticated.  
Systems are usually tailored to minimize these errors and to 
reflect the risk associated with the service being protected. So, 
for example, a biometric that grants access to a bank account 
might require a 99% matching confidence whereas a biometric 
that allows you to pay for a meal in an employee canteen could 
be set much lower. 
Jain et al. [24] propose a set of requirements that help to 
identify a viable biometric: 
 Universality, which means the majority of people should 
possess the biometric; 
 Distinctiveness, which means that the particular 
characteristic is sufficiently different between humans to 
support identity verification; 
 Permanence, the characteristic does not change 
significantly over time; 
 Collectability, which means we can quantify the 
measurement which facilitates automated comparison; 
 Performance, the fact that the biometric can be matched 
accurately, speedily, with reasonable resources.  
The first aspect is not as easy to satisfy as it seems at first 
glance. About 2% of the US population does not have a 
fingerprint that can be read [31]. Other biometrics, such as 
facial biometrics, are more universal, but deliver much higher 
error rates, since distinctiveness is far poorer than it is for 
fingerprints. Fingerprints also fail the permanence 
characteristic since females’ fingerprints become less 
prominent as they age [37], which makes them difficult to 
capture with biometric readers. Some kinds of chemotherapy 
appear to remove fingerprints altogether [21]. Sometimes 
biometrics are combined to deal with potential problems with 
one particular biometric. So, for example, both fingerprint and 
face could be used in tandem to deliver a more reliable decision 
making process.  
An issue that Jain et al. [24] do not address is the 
invasiveness of the biometric reader. Invasiveness is a key 
aspect in whether people will accept the mechanism. Some 
biometrics, such as retina recognition, require the person to 
place their eye directly into a reader. On the other hand, some 
biometrics can be collected without the person’s knowledge, 
which means a potential attacker could collect and use the 
recorded biometric for nefarious purposes, without the owner’s 
knowledge.  
This brings us to a related characteristic, the ease with 
which a biometric can be copied. It is very difficult, but not 
impossible [18], to copy an Iris, but trivial to copy a voice or 
facial biometric. A copy can sometimes be used to fool the 
system into a false-accept decision. Usually, the more invasive 
a biometric reader, the harder the biometric is to copy. The 
other problem is related to the storage of the collected 
biometric template. Because of the indelible link to the true 
self, biometric templates have to be stored securely and 
protected far more assiduously than one does a password.  
The final characteristic is cost. The cheapest biometric 
readers are often the ones most easily fooled. The optical 
fingerprint reader, for example, is cheap and easily fooled by 
false fingers. The capacitance fingerprint readers, which test 
for liveness, are not as easily fooled but are also more 
expensive. Organizations will inevitably play off risk levels 
against the cost of readers which means that much-vaunted 
benefits of biometric usage often are not realized, so the 
customer’s privacy and rights have potentially been violated to 
no avail. Yet since the true “cost” is borne by the customer, the 
unreliability and untrustworthiness of the reader does not 
impact on the organization or hurt their profit margin. 
One of the most controversial biometrics is DNA. It is 
easily collected, without the consent or knowledge of the 
human source. The FBI used saliva from stamps to identify a 
World Trade Centre bomber [30], which was probably never 
anticipated by the person sending the letter. Researchers, for 
some time now, have been ringing alarm bells. Nelkin and 
Andrews cite Foucault [17] who warned that knowledge could 
be used to gain power. He hypothesized that tests would 
deliver the means to compare, differentiate and exclude. Nazi 
Germany’s persecution of people based on their heritage is a 
stark example of this. Magnet [27] explains how this kind of 
undesirable profiling can be supported by the use of biometrics.  
Nelkin and Andrews [30] report that the US military have 
decided to collect DNA samples from all their soldiers. They 
appear to have perfectly sound reasons for the collection of 
DNA samples: to identify soldiers killed in battle, to solve 
crimes. Yet some marines declined to comply. Those US 
marines who refused to have their DNA collected cited 
previous examples where the US government had failed to act 
in their interests, and coldly sacrificed soldiers for their own 
aims. Nelkin and Andrews mention Agent Orange usage in the 
1970s and the fact that soldiers were told to watch nuclear 
bombs going off when the tests were carried out. One can 
hardly blame the soldiers for their skepticism.  One could 
consider these lapses by the US government an aberration - we 
want to feel we can trust our government [20]. On the other 
hand no one expects corporations to be trustworthy: we know 
that they act in their own interests. A prime example is that of 
Google, whose CEO, after the UK government attempted to 
shame the company for their very successful tax avoidance 
schemes, triumphantly expressed pride in having pulled off the 
feat [39]. Expecting corporations to be moral is clearly naïve. 
The following section provides an example of the use of 
biometrics by a business in Glasgow 
III. BIOMETRIC USAGE EXAMPLE 
In October 2011 [6] a Glasgow nightclub announced that it 
would be using fingerprints to verify the age and identity of its 
customers. They claimed that this was being done in order to 
“tackle the city’s alcohol problems.” Such a sweeping claim 
demands further scrutiny. Closer examination raises the 
following questions and conundrums: 
 Are they suggesting that their current, flawed, access 
control mechanisms, for the three venues in question, are 
significantly contributing to Glasgow’s alcohol problems? 
Surely their contribution is fairly minor, given the size of 
Glasgow and the number of places people can buy alcohol. 
 Are they suggesting that they currently have significant 
problems inadvertently supplying alcohol to underage 
children, such that it warrants expenditure on such a 
system? Firstly this is debatable since UK legislation is 
very strict [9]. Secondly, they can, without incurring any 
cost at all, require everyone who looks under 25 to prove 
their age using an official identity document. The BBC [3] 
claims that 25% of underage drinkers get the alcohol from 
an older adult. The same news article suggests that off-
licences are selling alcohol to underage drinkers, and this 
is confirmed by another news report [16]. No mention is 
made of nightclubs in either report so their contribution to 
the underage drinking problem is probably minor.  
 Indeed, many young people already carry a convenient 
form of identity with them: their driver’s license. The 
Scottish Government  [36] reports that 60% of males in the 
20-24 age range possess driver’s licenses, with just under 
50% of women driving. Is the fingerprint reader really 
better than this widely-accepted mechanism, which also 
bears a biometric: the person’s face? A number of clubbers 
will also possess passports. A valid form of identification 
is mandatory to register for the touted fingerprint scheme. 
One wonders why this cannot be used to prove age at 
every visit. 
 The clubs do not appear to offer their customers the 
opportunity to opt out. Indeed, a web log1 confirms that at 
least some customers are not being offered any choice or 
that the fingerprints are being recorded while they are 
inebriated. Moreover, staff at the club the blogger is 
complaining about did not know where the data was being 
held, or who had access to it.  
 The scanner being used appears to be the Scannet. The 
manufacturer’s website2  provides guidance from the UK 
information commissioner, acknowledging the very 
personal nature of the data being collected. One can 
therefore understand the club’s attempt to market this 
endeavor with the claim that they are solving a huge social 
problem in Glasgow. They are clearly hoping to offset any 
criticism that might result should customers realize that 
their personal data is being held by the nightclub for an 
undisclosed period of time.  The FAQ page3 revealed that 
a facial image was also being collected by the system, 
supporting multi-modal biometric use, even more invasive 
than a single mode biometric.   
 Mackenzie [25] says, while proclaiming the excellence of 
the scheme: “Citti said it provides huge scope when it 
comes to marketing”. Here the nub of the matter is 
revealed. The real purpose behind the scheme is the 
opportunity it affords to perform market segmentation and 
to track clubbers’ attendance and behaviour in the clubs. 
This is also alluded to on the manufacturer’s website. 
Hence the scanning of clubbers’ fingerprints has less to do 
with tackling the city’s alcohol problems than with (1) making 
things more convenient for bouncers, and (2) making even 
more money from clubbers by being able to target them, and 
their wallets, far more intelligently. The real motivator is profit, 
and the maximization thereof, while the rights of customers are 
being sacrificed. However hard we look at this example, the 
only minor advantage to the clubber is that they no longer have 
to carry identity cards. This seems a very small benefit in 
return for giving a club access to such very personal details as 
fingerprints and behaviour logging.  Moreover, surveys suggest 
that people will accept the use of biometrics for law 
enforcement and immigration purposes, but they less 
supportive of the use of biometrics for access control or 
attendance monitoring [15]. It is puzzling that people will 
willingly give their fingerprints to this nightclub. One can only 
surmise that the touted convenience is so enticing that they do 
not give sufficient thought to what they are giving away. 
IV. VULNERABILITY OF BIOMETRIC COLLECTION SYSTEMS 
Figure 1 demonstrates a simplified architecture for 
collecting and using biometrics. Whereas the purveyors of 
these systems claim impressive levels of reliability, the reality 
                                                          
1 http://forums.pepipoo.com/lofiversion/index.php/t66824.html 
2 http://nightclub.co.uk/downloads/CustomerNotice‐A3_d.pdf 
is somewhat less impressive. Each component of the diagram is 
vulnerable to attack but even if no one attempts to compromise 
the integrity of the system it can still deliver the incorrect 
decision. Enrolment is the key to the success of later use. If the 
initial feature vector is suboptimal or poorly recorded the 
person might well experience difficulties being authorized at 
later access attempts.  
 
Figure 1. Biometric Collection and Verification 
Sometimes the reader cannot read the person’s fingerprint 
correctly when they return at a later date, due to an injury or 
some other reason outwith their control. The legitimate person 
will be denied entry to the club: an undesirable event given 
their potential for spending money. The system also has a 
number of important operational needs. The sensor that reads 
the fingerprint relies on an uninterrupted power supply, the 
right levels of humidity, moderate temperature and a clean 
surface. The manufacturers of the scanner used in the 
nightclubs in Glasgow said this on their FAQ website3: “The 
scanner could be dirty i.e. from moisturiser THE ONLY WAY 
TO CLEAN your scanner is by placing sellotape across the 
screen and lifting - DO NOT RUB WITH A CLOTH OR LICK”.  
If use of the reader is not carefully monitored it is likely 
that people could use fake fingerprints to “spoof” the reader. 
Thus a supervisor needs to monitor the use thereof 
continuously. If the database is compromised, the integrity of 
the stored records becomes suspect, which renders matching 
decisions untrustworthy. The constituent parts need to 
communicate with each other and in systems where the 
components reside on different hardware the communication 
can also be subverted. In the example given above, all the 
components appear to be situated within a single hardware box, 
making it easier to resist such attacks. Unfortunately, Scannet 
publish their default password on their FAQ website. Given the 
fact that very few people change default passwords, as 
evidenced by the phone hacking scandal of 2011 [28], this 
means that the data is potentially unprotected and unsecured. If 
the security of the records is suspect, this renders the entire 
mechanism less trustworthy. Even a superficial scrutiny of this 
scheme reveals security and operational flaws, convincing the 
authors of this paper to give these nightclubs a miss. 
                                                          
3 This advice has now been removed 
V. MORE BIOMETRIC USAGE EXAMPLES 
Figure 2 provides some examples of the use of biometrics by 
big business across the world. The concern, with all of these 
uses, is whether the customer or employee retains the right to 
opt out. It was not possible to confirm or deny this from the 
news reports.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Examples of the use of Biometrics by Corporations (Appendix A) 
The problem we seek to highlight is that human rights very 
seldom enter the equation when biometrics are deployed by big 
business. People are simply expected to comply with the 
demands of organizations that decide to deploy biometrics for a 
variety of purposes, usually because the biometric makes 
things easier for them, not because of customer or employee 
demand.  This is demonstrated very well by the practices of 
Nedbank in 2011 (Figure 4). Their implementation required 
anyone visiting their branches to present a fingerprint to gain 
entry4. There was an outcry from various citizens 5 especially 
since the company says that they will share the data, but do not 
specify who the recipients of such shared data will be, or the 
pretexts under which this will occur.  The blog in Figure 3 
suggests that customers were not even given the opportunity to 
opt out of the scheme 6 . Nedbank has reportedly now 
abandoned this scheme7. 
One wonders which third parties they provide their databases 
to (as stated on their poster in Figure 4 - bottom right). 
Finally, many 21st century companies are global, which raises 
some important questions with respect to their use of 
biometrics. Where is the biometric data actually stored? It 
could be stored in the cloud, which is probably located in 
another country. The UK has very strict laws about storage 
                                                          
4http://www.moneyweb.co.za/moneyweb‐financial/nedbank‐pilots‐branch‐
biometric‐access‐control 
5 http://medialternatives.com/2012/01/04/nedbanks‐biometric‐bungle‐
exposes‐personal‐info‐bill‐shortcomings/ 
6 http://www.thehubsa.co.za/forum/topic/114903‐nedbank‐collecting‐
fingerprints/ 
7  http://medialternatives.com/2013/01/16/nedbank‐abandons‐its‐biometric‐
fingerprinting‐devices/ 
and protection of personal data, and much of the European 
Union mirrors these. Other countries are far more laissez faire 
with personal data. Once a UK customer’s biometric data 
leaves the UK’s jurisdiction, and protective laws, how well 
will it be protected? How are those who wish to use this data 
for nefarious purposes to be prevented from doing so? If the 
UK government cannot even make multi-national companies 
pay fair taxes [39] how will they protect individual citizens’ 
personal biometric data when it is held in another country. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Blog (“Just went to Nedbank in Pinetown and was surprised to see 
that prior to entry I had my photo and fingerprint taken. The branch manager 
couldn’t tell where my data is stored or for how long it is stored. Is this legal?” 
Posted 4 April 2012) 
VI. ETHICS CONSIDERATIONS 
Biometrics might well not be the panacea they’re often touted 
as. They are indelibly bound up with our person, and thus 
inherently part of whom we are. For everyone promoting 
biometrics as the silver bullet to solve all identification 
problems8 there is someone else expressing grave concerns 
about their increasingly widespread use9.  Sylvia Venier  [41] 
posed the following challenging questions regarding 
biometrics and multiculturalism: 
 
 Whether ethnicity can be derived from biometric data 
 Whether different ethnic groups find it more or less 
problematic to participate in biometric identification 
 Whether there might be a risk of discrimination against 
minorities  
 Whether any risk exists that groups of people can be 
categorised through profiling. 
Obviously these are very challenging questions from an ethics 
point of view and, according to Venier [41], no research 
results have provided any clear motivations to ignore any of 
these highly contentious ethical issues. 
 
Except for the general ethical issues identified by Venier 
above, two very specific and sensitive ethical aspects still 
remain problematic; that of social exclusion and privacy. 
 
From prior research it is clear that there are always going to be 
some individuals or groups of people who cannot reliably 
enroll or verify some or all of their biometrics [43]. He further 
points out that false negatives could have disastrous effects on  
                                                          
8 http://www.hitachi.com/rd/yrl/people/info_security/03.html 
9http://www.bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/home/2012/08/are-you-ready-to-provide-
your-fingerprint-on-demand.html#.UKCK8YZk1GM 
people’s lives, but, “not being able to drive away in one’s car, 
or boot a computer could be bad enough, but consider the 
stress that would be suffered if your facial biometrics was  
rejected at passport control.” Also, some groups of people are 
more likely to be disadvantaged by the use of biometrics, like; 
people with physical disabilities, those with mental illness, the 
elderly, people of certain races, people of certain religions and 
the homeless [43].  
 
There are many who consider the collection and use of 
biometrics a privacy violation that ought not to be imposed on 
people who are uncomfortable with their use. Solove [38] 
delineates privacy as follows:  
 
“privacy is a sweeping concept, encompassing 
(among other things) freedom of thought, control 
over one’s body, solitude in one’s home, control over 
personal information, freedom from surveillance, 
protection of one’s reputation, and protection from 
searches and interrogations” (p. 1) 
 
He also argues that privacy is the cornerstone of freedom, 
democracy and psychological well being. Back in 1967 
Westin [42] expressed concerns about the impact of 
surveillance on privacy.  Today people are even more 
concerned, since organizations often put their own 
convenience ahead of the privacy rights of their customers or 
employees. A prime example is that British schools are 
collecting biometrics of children without parents’ consent 
[35]. Yet another example is that the UK police will be 
compiling a database of photos of people who have not 
committed any crime [32].  
Specific concerns relate to how biometrics will be stored, who 
will have access to them, what purpose(s) they will be used 
for, and how reliable biometric authentication is.  To address 
concerns about the biometric being compromised if a 
biometric database is accessed by an unauthorized person, the 
biometric is not stored as an image: it is stored in digital 
format which cannot easily be used to reconstruct the original 
biometric. However, new attacks emerge yearly, which show 
that it is possible for biometric templates, previously 
considered invincible, to be compromised [18]. 
 
The concerns with respect to unauthorized access are well 
founded. Biometrics are classified as personal data, and in the 
UK this means that the organization holding the data has to 
comply with the Data Protection Act of 1998. However, a 
recent survey by the BSI10 found that one in five businesses 
admitted breaching this act. The UK information 
commissioner announced in August 2012 that data breaches 
had increased tenfold in the last five years [7]. This proves 
that organizations probably cannot be trusted to look after our 
personal data. When this data is a biometric its loss is far more 
serious than the loss of a mere password.  
 
However, the emergent ethics, social and political 
ramifications of the growing use of biometrics are also 
entwined with the prospects of a memory that is not prone to 
                                                          
10 http://shop.bsigroup.com/en/Browse-By-Subject/Data-Protection--Freedom-
of-Information/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.. Nedbank’s Customers gain access to branches using their Fingerprints  
(bottom para: “Nedbank will only process and act upon the personal information supplied for purposes of the appropriate internal and external reporting to prevent 
crime and to pursue its own legitimate interests and those of third parties to whom the personal information is supplied”) 
natural and healthy forgetting. For instance, a ‘right to be 
forgotten’ is now included in Article 17 of the European 
Commission proposal for a General Data Protection 
Regulation [25]. In diffusing control over memory-of-the-self, 
what threats do the corporate spread of biometrics pose to 
attempts to establish and protect the right to be forgotten? 
 
Nelkin and Andrews [30] quote a US marine who refused to 
give a DNA sample to the US military. He said: “Your body is 
one of the few things you have control over”. Yet when 
various measures of our bodies are encoded and stored by 
untrusted entities, with no recourse offered should they 
divulge or fail to protect it, do we still have control over our 
bodies? Are customers sacrificing this without thought, to 
their own detriment? Google trends (Figure 5) provides a 
snapshot indication of concern about biometrics over time and 
it seems that people are becoming sufficiently accustomed to 
their use that they no longer feel as great a need to seek out 
more information. Corporations are slowly habituating us to 
their use of biometrics so that we accede to their demands for 
our most personal information. Unfortunately, in becoming 
accustomed to anything, we run the risk of not seeing its 
dangers, and biometrics are no exception. 
 
Figure 5. Google Trends result for “Biometrics” 2 July 2015 
Mayhew [29] reports that the Indian government will be 
collecting biometric data from some of their most vulnerable 
citizens: orphaned and fostered children. The cited reason is: 
“These measures are adapted as a means to prevent another 
Rohtak shelter incident from happening, where children were 
allegedly sexually abused and tortured”. Raza [33] relates how 
the staff in these homes subjected the children to horrific abuse. 
It is not clear how collecting the children’s biometrics is meant 
to prevent such abuse; neither report explains this. It is 
particularly concerning that the most vulnerable members of 
society have their biometrics collected without anyone acting 
to ensure that it is indeed warranted and justified, and it is 
unlikely that this will prevent abuse as they hope it will. Along 
with this, the issue of social exclusion is a definite ethics issue. 
It boils down to sacrificing some people in the interests of 
others [43]. From the above, it is clear that biometrics, from a 
technical point of view, will not be viable unless these ethical 
concerns have been satisfactorily addressed. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Historically, organizations have had patchy records in 
guarding the safety of their employees. For example, workers 
were sometimes expected to carry out dangerous jobs without 
the right equipment or protection. The Forth Bridge visitor 
centre in Scotland claims that 63 people died building the 
bridge. Yet no workers died during the building of the entire 
Olympic village that opened in 2012. This is no doubt at least 
partly due to the health and safety regulations that are strictly 
enforced within the UK, preventing employers from putting 
their workers at risk and mandating safety practices.  
 
Unfortunately, we cannot expect corporations to behave 
morally because it is the right thing to do: their focus is to 
maximize return on investment and some often act as if the end 
justifies whatever means they can employ to achieve this. The 
worldwide recession we are currently experiencing has been 
attributed directly to the rash behavior of bankers Error! 
Reference source not found.. That said, there are two central 
ways for people to be protected from the exploitation of big 
business. The first is for legislation to be passed that prevents 
companies from specific exploitative practices. Indeed Rose 
and Spiegel [34] report that countries with looser credit 
regulations appeared to have suffered the worst crises, which 
seems to confirm that bad behaviour by banks, unchecked by 
legislation, played a role in causing this recession. Companies 
are often ingenious in marketing biometric use in ways that 
make it seem legitimate and perfectly reasonable. Lawgivers 
are thus not sufficiently concerned to enact laws. The only 
viable (and second) option, therefore, is for people to act to 
protect themselves. Declining to have our biometrics collected 
is the only secure means, i.e. our watchword should be: 
“Caveat Humana”: retain your individuality and your right to 
your own body 
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7-144550#axzz2Bwbf6qN5 
Sony: http://www.sony.co.uk/hub/discover-vaio/5 
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amman‐bank‐uses‐biometrics‐to‐register‐100000‐customers/ 
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Standard Life: 
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